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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
The Missouri Coalition Against Domestic and Sexual Violence (MCADSV). 
MCADSV’s mission is to unite Missourians with a shared value that rape and abuse must 
end, and advances this through education, alliance, research, and public policy. For more 
than 35 years, MCADSV has worked with lawmakers at the federal and state level to 
develop public policies necessary to protect the health and safety of victims of domestic 
and sexual violence. MCADSV is currently Missouri’s sole provider of domestic and 
sexual violence technical assistance and education. MCADSV has an interest in signing on
to this brief because our organization supports sexual assault survivors in redressing the 
abuse they suffered, and one way they should be able to do this is through the justice 
system. 
Missouri KidsFirst is the statewide network of Child Advocacy Centers and the 
Missouri Chapter of Prevent Child Abuse America. Missouri KidsFirst’s mission is to 
empower adults to protect children from abuse. We are the state’s leading voice for child 
protection and through our programs and policy efforts we educate parents, teachers, 
physicians, lawmakers, and other community members so they have the tools they need to 
stand up for children who experience or are at risk of experiencing abuse or neglect. 
Missouri KidsFirst has an interest in signing on to this brief because our network is 
committed to ensuring that victims of child sexual abuse have access to services that help 
them achieve justice and healing, including access to the courts. 
SNAP is an independent, peer network of survivors of institutional sexual abuse and 
their supporters who work to prevent future cases of abuse and ensure that survivors today 
have access to support resources that can help them heal. We have been providing support 
and advocacy to victims of sexual abuse in institutional settings for 30 years and today we 
count more than 25,000 survivors and supporters in our global network. Our mission is to 

































mission through public education and private support provided by the tireless efforts of 
volunteer leaders worldwide. 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The statistics are overwhelming. “One in four girls and one in six boys will be 
sexually abused before they turn 18 years old.” Get Statistics, NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
RES. CTR., https://www.nsvrc.org/node/4737 (last visited Jan. 24, 2020). “A person is 
abused in the United States every 9 seconds.” Statistics, THE CTR. FOR FAMILY JUSTICE, 
https://centerforfamilyjustice.org/community-education/statistics/ (last visited Jan. 24,
2020) (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, https://www.bjs.gov/ (last visited Jan. 24, 
2020)). “A report of child abuse is made every 10 seconds.” Id. (citing AM. SOC’Y FOR THE
POSITIVE CARE OF CHILDREN, https://americanspcc.org/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2020)).
“There are more than 42 million survivors of sexual abuse in America. (National 
Association of Adult Survivors of Child Abuse).” Facts and Stats, LAUREN’S KIDS, 
https://laurenskids.org/awareness/about-faqs/facts-and-stats/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2020). 
“Child sexual abuse exploits and degrades children and can cause serious damage to 
cognitive, social, and emotional development of a child.” Preventing Child Sexual Abuse, 
PREVENT CHILD ABUSE AM., https://preventchildabuse.org/resource/preventing-child-
sexual-abuse/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2020). 
Advocates for children have taught us “child sexual abuse is both everyone’s 
problem and responsibility. The goal of such public education efforts is to eliminate any 
tolerance for sexual abuse or confusion over what society condones as appropriate 
interactions between adults and children.” Id. (emphasis added). 
Amici organizations are devoted to ending the sexual abuse of children and 
receiving justice for all abused victims. We have fought sexual abuse in the workplace, in 
public and private schools, and in nonreligious organizations and churches. The abuse is 



































frequently protected such abuse, believing that abuse-related decisions were protected by
privacy or by religious liberty. The courts, correctly, rarely wanted to interfere with the 
free practice of religion, as this Court has demonstrated in its own decisions. However, 
freedom of religion does not, nor was it meant to, protect sexual abuse. As one court stated, 
“The First Amendment is not a safe haven for a sexual predator and his enabler.” Doe v. 
Roman Catholic Bishop of Orange, No. SACV1701424CJCJCGX, 2018 WL 6118442, at 
*1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2018). 
The disgusting and pervasive facts of sexual abuse across the country have changed 
the law’s perspective on the reach of religious freedom. They have clarified that sexual 
abuse, and the protection of abusers from courts and law enforcement, are always against 
“neutral principles of law” and can be handled justly by state and federal courts without
imposing on religious freedom. Allowing survivors of abuse into court is one of the best 
ways to ensure the bedrock principle of justice for all. 
This Court recognized that essential point in Gibson v. Brewer by reversing the
lower court’s dismissal of an intentional failure to supervise claim against the Diocese. 952
S.W.2d 239, 250 (Mo. banc 1997). The experience of the past has occasionally kept courts 
from seeing how illegal conduct must be recognized and punished, instead of protected. 
This Court now has the opportunity to set a precedent that child abuse, by anyone, is not to 
be tolerated. 
We understand the horrible abuse, its legacy, and the cover-up better today than we
did when the country first started to recognize sexual abuse. We ask this Court to now 
clarify that the sexual abuse of children is not protected generally by state or federal law 
and not specifically by Gibson. This Court should allow victim John Doe 122 his day in 





































I. Gibson Allows This Lawsuit to Proceed.
Gibson v. Brewer involved a lawsuit by Catholic Michael Gibson against the
Catholic Diocese of Kansas City-St. Joseph for sexual contact imposed upon him by Father 
Michael Brewer. Id. at 243. In Gibson, this Court did not block a breach of fiduciary duty
claim, concluding merely that the facts of that tort had not been established in that
particular case. Id. at 245. Therefore, Gibson gives the Court no reason to reject a breach 
of fiduciary duty claim against a Diocese, as long as the elements are met. 
This Court also ruled that the trial court in Gibson erred in dismissing an intentional 
failure to supervise clergy claim. Id. at 248. It also dismissed an intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim (IIED) on the facts, arguing that in that particular case, the 
conduct was not outrageous enough for IIED. Id. at 249. Gibson thus left claims for 
intentional failure to supervise clergy and IIED open for future litigation, as occurred in 
this case. 
On four other torts, however, Gibson ruled that allowing courts to hear such cases 
would entangle the courts too frequently in religious disputes that the courts could not
handle without infringing on religious freedom. Id. at 246–47. These torts were negligent
hiring/ordination/retention of clergy, negligent failure to supervise clergy, negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, and the Diocese’s independent negligence. Id. at 246–50. 
This Court recognized that “[r]eligious organizations are not immune from civil liability 
for the acts of their clergy.” Id. at 246 (emphasis added). Citing Supreme Court cases, this 
Court clearly stated that if “neutral principles of law can be applied without determining 
questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice, then a court may impose liability.” Id. 
(citing Presbyterian Church v. Mary Eliz. Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 
440, 449 (1969); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979); Presbytery of Elijah Par. 

































Recent decisions in courts around the country confirm there are numerous sexual 
abuse cases where Dioceses and other religious administrators can be held liable due to 
their clear violation of “neutral principles of law.” See, e.g., Bandstra v. Covenant 
Reformed Church, 913 N.W.2d 19, 37 (Iowa 2018); Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic 
Diocesan Corp., No. KNLCV175015369, 2018 WL 650376, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 
2018); Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. KNLCV175015307, 2018 
WL 650358, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2018). The trend is toward opening the courts 
to protect the abused. Gibson left open the possibility that in circumstances where neutral 
principles apply, a lawsuit should proceed. Therefore, the circuit and appellate courts 
should have applied those lessons here and allowed John Doe 122’s lawsuit to continue.
In this case, Appellant Doe filed a lawsuit for sexual abuse or battery, negligent 
supervision, intentional failure to supervise clergy, negligent failure to supervise children, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of fiduciary duty. Doe 122 v.
Marianist Province of U. S., No. ED 107767, 2019 WL 7341484, at *7 (Mo. Ct. App.
Dec. 31, 2019). Respondents successfully argued, in the circuit and the appeals courts, that 
Gibson bars those claims. Id. at *2. The circuit court ruled that the negligence claims were 
barred by Gibson, and that there was no proof of intent for the intentional failure to 
supervise clergy claim. Id. at *4–5. The circuit court also granted summary judgment on 
the issues of sexual abuse or battery, negligent supervision, intentional failure to supervise 
clergy, negligent failure to supervise children, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
and breach of fiduciary duty. Id. Appellant chose to appeal only the rulings on negligent 
supervision, intentional failure to supervise clergy, and negligent failure to supervise 
children. Id. at *1, n.2. In ruling against him on these claims, the court of appeals relied on 
Gibson, stating that “because Appellant’s negligent supervision and negligent failure to 
supervise children claims would require interpretation of religion doctrine, policy, and 
administration amounting to an excessive entanglement between church and state, the trial 





































Because the facts of Gibson were insufficient to support the tort claims in that 
particular case, we argue that Gibson does not bar the three remaining claims on appeal. 
The facts of this case support an application of neutral principles of the law; therefore, 
Appellant Doe 122’s claims of negligent supervision, intentional failure to supervise 
clergy, and negligent failure to supervise children should proceed.
II. Appellants’ Negligent Supervision and Negligent Failure to Supervise Children 
Lawsuits Can Be Litigated According to Neutral Principles of Law. 
A California district court recently reminded us that the First Amendment does not 
offer a “safe haven” to sexual abusers:
Plaintiff’s Complaint states a claim for negligent hiring, retention, and 
supervision and for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Every 
employer, including one with religious affiliation, has a duty to protect its 
employees from an individual known to sexually abuse and harass them. The 
First Amendment is not a safe haven for a sexual predator and his enabler.
Doe v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Orange, No. SACV1701424CJCJCGX, 2018 WL 
6118442, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2018) (emphasis added). Because religious freedom 
does not protect sexual abuse, Appellant Doe’s negligent supervision and negligent failure
to supervise children claims should proceed.
In Roman Catholic Bishop of Orange, Father Kim, a Catholic pastor, rubbed his
genitals on his employee, Jane Doe, and frequently “forcibly kissed, groped, and fondled 
her.” Id. at *1. Despite her repeated protests, Kim would not stop the abuse. Id. at *1–2. In 
court, Jane Doe alleged that the Diocese of Orange had known of Kim’s history of sexual 
predation and done nothing to stop it or protect her. Id. at *2. The court ruled that the 
Diocese’s power could not be used “to shut the courthouse door on Plaintiff’s claims,” and 
that her lawsuit for negligent hiring, retention and supervision, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, did not intrude on the defendant’s religious freedom. Id. at *3. The court 
emphasized “the Diocese of Orange offers no religious justification for the sexual 






































occurred. Id. at *4. Similarly, as in this Doe 122’s case, the lower courts did not proffer a 
religious explanation for the alleged sexual abuse.
Moreover, the California court demonstrated that a negligence suit against a 
religious diocese can proceed on secular grounds:
The primary factual inquiries of Plaintiff’s cause of action are whether the 
Diocese of Orange negligently placed her under Father Kim’s supervision, 
when it knew that Father Kim had a history of sexual misconduct against
women, and whether the Diocese of Orange took any action to investigate, 
supervise, or monitor Father Kim to ensure the safety of women in the parish. 
The legal inquiry at the heart of Plaintiff’s cause of action is whether the 
specific danger that ultimately manifested itself, sexual harassment and 
battery, reasonably could have been foreseen. 
Id. at *4. Such a negligence suit, the court continued, does not require an “inquir[y] into 
the Diocese of Orange’s broad reasons for choosing [the defendant] as a priest, or returning 
[the defendant] to ministry after treating him at a facility for sexually deviant clergy, or 
making him pastor of [another church].” Id. Instead, the focus of the inquiry should be on 
whether the “sexual misconduct against Plaintiff could have reasonably been foreseen and 
prevented”; the fact that the alleged abuser is a religious diocese should not impact the tort 
analysis. Id. The Diocese’s “failure to protect Plaintiff from [the defendant] and his sexual 
misconduct” is “expressly prohibited by the Diocese of Orange’s own policies and by law.”
Id. The court’s language here is reminiscent of some older cases that held religious 
organizations liable for their sexual abuse: “[W]hether [a church] reasonably should have
foreseen the risk of harm to third parties . . . is a neutral principle of tort law.” Malicki v. 
Doe, 814 So.2d 347, 364 (Fla. 2002).
Connecticut took a similar approach in the cases of Tyron Doe and Jessie Doe. Both
Does alleged negligent hiring and supervision claims against the Norwich Roman Catholic 
Diocese because its employee, Brother Paul, abused them. See Doe v. Norwich Roman 
Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. KNLCV175015307, 2018 WL 650358 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Jan. 5, 2018); Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. KNLCV175015369, 


































negligence suit against the Diocese could proceed on secular terms and “not entangle the 
court with religious doctrine.” 2018 WL 650358, at *5; 2018 WL 650376, at *4. In the 
court’s words: 
The common-law doctrine of negligence does not intrude upon the free 
exercise of religion, as it does not discriminate against [a] religious belief or 
regulate or prohibit conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons . . . 
The court’s determination of an action against the defendants based upon 
their alleged negligent supervision of [a priest] would not prejudice or 
impose upon any of the religious tenets or practices of Catholicism. Rather, 
such a determination would involve an examination of the defendants’ 
possible role in allowing one of its employees to engage in conduct which 
they, as employers, as well as society in general, expressly prohibit. Since 
the Supreme Court has consistently failed to allow the Free Exercise Clause 
to relieve [an] individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the 
promotion or restriction of religious beliefs, the defendants [cannot] 
appropriately implicate the First Amendment as a defense to their alleged 
negligent conduct. 
2018 WL 650358, at *3 (quoting Noll v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 
No. X04–CV–02–4034702–S, 2008 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2661 (Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 2008)); 
2018 WL 650376, at *3 (citation omitted). Of relevance to this case, the court also made 
the point that whether Brother Paul was a brother or a priest would not have affected the 
justiciability of the case because the allegations were not about “theological perceptions”
but instead focused on “his criminal conduct and/or propensity for the same.” 2018 WL
650358, at *5. Like the cases of Tyron Doe and Jessie Doe, John Doe 122’s case focuses 
on the negligent conduct of the defendants, not on any theological perceptions or ideas. 
Other courts, like this Court, continue to regulate the difference between secular and 
religious lawsuits. A Massachusetts lawsuit against a Catholic bishop, Daniel Cronin, for
negligent supervision proceeded, but one for negligent hiring did not. Andrews v. Cronin, 
No. 1581CV03980, 2018 WL 2050171, at *10–12 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 2018). The
decision was influenced by the elements of the case, as it should be in this case. “Negligent 
retention [and/or supervision] occurs when, during the course of employment, the employer 



































his unfitness, and the employer fails to take further action such as investigating, discharge 
or reassignment.” Id. at *1. The Massachusetts court stated that liability is present if the 
bishop “should have known” about the abuser’s activities and could reasonably have 
foreseen harm to a plaintiff. Id. at *3. Therefore, the relevant inquiry was whether, if Bishop 
Cronin had known about the time the wrongdoer was spending with the plaintiffs, further
investigation would have been appropriate given the reasonable foreseeability of sexual 
misconduct under those circumstances. Id. 
Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court allowed Jane Doe, who was sexually assaulted 
by a youth pastor at her church, to sue the church’s pastor and the church for negligently
hiring, supervising, and retaining the youth pastor. Doe v. Coe, 135 N.E.3d 1, 20 (Ill. 2019). 
The court reminded readers that a direct lawsuit can be brought against the employer if an 
employee was acting outside the scope of his employment. Id. at 12. “Negligent hiring,
negligent supervision, and negligent retention are all direct causes of action against the 
employer for the employer’s misconduct in failing to reasonably hire, supervise, or retain
the employee.” Id. According to Doe v. Coe, the elements of negligent supervision are 
“(1) the defendant had a duty to supervise the harming party, (2) the defendant negligently 
supervised the harming party, and (3) such negligence proximately caused the plaintiff’s 
injuries.” Id. at 15 (citations omitted). The plaintiffs in that case could meet those elements, 
just as plaintiff John Doe 122 can here.  
In Coe, the facts showed the youth pastor had used his accessible pseudonymous 
identity to access pornographic activity online. Id. at 8. The court addressed the reasons 
why a lawsuit should proceed: 
Certainly it is foreseeable and likely that a youth group member could be
harmed by a failure to act reasonably in hiring, supervising, and retaining a 
director of youth ministries. The magnitude of the burden of guarding against
the harm alleged here is small, as reasonably hiring, supervising, and 
retaining employees are duties that benefit the employer even apart from 
preventing potential harm to third parties. The burden seems even smaller 
when compared with the magnitude of the harm to be prevented. Finally, the 




































typically already strive to perform these duties in a reasonable manner. To 
the extent that plaintiffs have pled and can prove that FCCD, James, or both 
hired, supervised, and retained Coe, we find that they had a duty to plaintiffs 
to do so reasonably.
Id. at 13. 
In Iowa, the state supreme court allowed one negligent supervision claim to proceed 
against a church. Bandstra v. Covenant Reformed Church, 913 N.W.2d 19, 46 (Iowa 2018) 
(the other negligent supervision claim brought by another victim was barred by the statute 
of limitations). That court, too, explained why certain lawsuits could be brought according 
to neutral principles of the law: 
While the decision whether to invite certain speakers, or use certain rhetoric, 
is protected religious decision-making, reasonable supervision of an 
employee is a principle of tort law that applies neutrally to all employers.
Further, the Church confirmed during oral argument that the Church’s
supervision, or lack thereof, was not grounded in any religious doctrine or 
teachings. Although the elders and Edouard were both religious figures, 
working pursuant to their deeply held faiths, this status does not “excuse 
[them] from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that 
the State is free to regulate.” [(citation omitted).] Indeed, any burden that 
may result from imposing a secular duty to inquire into the whereabouts and 
potential misconduct of a pastor is no more than an “incidental effect of a 
generally applicable” tort principle, which does not offend the First 
Amendment. 
Id. at 42–43 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The Iowa court also dismissed any 
argument that suing churches violated the Establishment Clause: 
Moreover, the resolution of questions of foreseeability and reasonableness 
will not implicate any Establishment Clause concerns. To discern whether it 
was foreseeable that Edouard was engaging in criminal conduct, a court must 
determine what the elders knew or should have known. In turn, a court must 
decide whether the supervision of Edouard, in light of the foreseeable risks, 
was reasonable. A court need not interpret any doctrine, nor otherwise
impermissibly entangle itself with religion, in order to conclude the elders
owed a duty to its parishioners to supervise Edouard. Indeed, failing to hold 
religious employers accountable for their failure to supervise their 








































Id. at 13 (emphasis added). Though the defendant is a religious figure, as all the defendants 
were in the previously cited cases, he is not immune from punishment for violation of valid 
neutral laws. John Doe 122’s lawsuit should continue because it is based on solid legal 
principles, as in these other Doe cases.
III. The Dissenting Judge is Correct that the Intentional Failure to Supervise Clergy 
Claim Should Proceed. 
One factual part of Gibson is significant. When Gibson and his parents complained 
of authentic sexual abuse, the church officials told them that Brewer’s conduct “happens 
to young men all the time” and was nothing but “an innocent pat on the butt.” Gibson v. 
Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 248 (Mo. banc 1997) (emphasis added). These comments reflect
a pattern of behavior that the courts have seen repeatedly; a pattern of sexual abuse that is
met with cover-ups, apathy, and even flimsy excuses. 
Discomfort with sexual abuse frequently leaves church members using vague, less 
threatening language in their conversations to hide the awful things that happened. In John 
Doe 1 v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia & St. Charles Borromeo Seminary, for example, a 
victim reported abuse to his pastor, Father Griffin. No. L-000950-16, 2019 WL 7496606, 
at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Mar. 20, 2019). Instead of helping the victim or offering 
him comfort, Father Griffin allegedly told plaintiff, “[T]hese things [do] not happen and . . . 
people should not speak of these types of matters.” Id. (emphasis added).
Father Thomas Doyle, who has served a long and heroic life protecting victims of
sexual abuse, testified about this system of cover-ups in his deposition in this case. Doyle 
explained that “‘[i]n the documentation that is habitually used by religious superiors and 
bishops and other clerics that [he has] reviewed over three decades, [he has] never seen 
sexual abuse of minors directly referred to with the proper direct language,’ as it is ‘always 
referred to in some form of coded or euphemistic language.’” Doe 122, 2019 WL 7341484,
at *7. “Reported sexual abuse of children was not referenced in Bro. Woulfe’s records even 










































This system of cover-ups should not be tolerated any longer. We encourage this 
Court to bring this abuse out into the open by allowing the lawsuit against Marianist 
Province and Chaminade to proceed, which is consistent with the core principles of Gibson
and the testimony of Father Thomas Doyle.
The dissent noted that Father Doyle’s testimony was relevant evidence to the 
intentional failure to supervise clergy claim and that the testimony was not “merely 
speculative,” as the majority argued. Id. at *12 (Quigless, J., dissenting). She believed the
issue should go to the jury: “[T]he jury should be allowed to consider, weigh, and determine
the meaning of . . . [Father Doyle’s] evidence.” Id. at *13. Without admitting the evidence, 
the dissent argued, “no plaintiff would ever be able to prove that a defendant had the 
requisite knowledge of wrongdoing unless the defendant admits to having such knowledge,
which is unlikely.” Id.
Father Thomas Doyle is a respected researcher and expert on these types of cases. 
He has testified in other cases mentioned in this brief. The summary judgment record in 
Andrews v. Cronin, No. 1581CV03980, 2018 WL 2050171, at *2–3 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Mar. 5, 2018), for example, includes a Doyle report. In that case, Doyle testified that the 
predator’s excessive travel time with boys was “highly unusual” and “should have
triggered inquiries from” the bishop. Id. at *2. Father Doyle’s testimony was persuasive 
enough to convince the Massachusetts court the decision about negligence should have 
gone to the jury. See also Rice v. Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown, 212 A.3d 1055, 1076 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2019), reh’g denied, No. 97 WDA 2018, 2019 Pa. Super. LEXIS 800 (Super. 
Ct. Aug. 14, 2019) (“When . . . a plaintiff alleges a fiduciary relationship with a religious 
institution or its leadership . . . this creates a jury question.”). 



































      
   
    
     
   
   
 
        
 
 
    
     
  




Across the country, the Does—like Jane, Tyron, Jessie, Jane, and John 122—have
suffered terrible injury from the wrongdoing of abusers and their employers, who protect 
the abusers and their institutions’ image rather than allowing victims to receive justice. We
have learned that numerous courts around the country have been able to pursue negligence 
lawsuits according to “neutral principles of law,” as Gibson requires. We ask you to let 
John Doe 122 join the other Does and have his day in court. 
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